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TOWARDS A FOREIGN POLICY OF MUTUALITY 
Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana) 
Montana State University, Bozeman, Montana 
~~ }(tt~;.?fer Saturday, June 10, 1972, 10:00 a.m., M.D.T. 
-------
I come here today to convey a word of optimism regarding 
the nation's foreign relations. Optimism in this connection is 
long overdue; still, I hope my reference to it at this t i me is 
not premature. Whatever the case, my expectation is that history 
may well record 1972 as the year in which a corner was turned 
f or peace. There are i ndications that the world is headed back 
towards constructive human purpose in its major internat i onal 
relationships. A water-shed appears t o have been reached after a 
quarter century of dangerous dallying in the murky detours of the 
Cold War. 
Insofar as the government of this nation is concerned, 
except in the case of Indochina, I believe the President is 
responding in a new fashion to international circumstances. He 
is projecting not as adversary but as conciliator. In so doing, 
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he is paying heed to the legitimate claims of a public 
sentiment gr~wn impatient with the words of peace, sung to 
the cadence of war. 
So, I address a word of hope especially to you men and 
women of this graduating class. Your generation can take a great 
deal of credit for bringing about this change. Your manifest 
disenchantment with the foreign policies of the past and with 
the tragic travesty in the name of peace in Indochina has been 
impressed on Washington. You have underscored the point that 
government is itself governed, in the final analysis, by the 
depth and degree of public support which can be commanded for 
its policies. 
You have helped to inject balance into official channels 
and, hopefully, to assure that government will not soon again 
indulge in meaningless adventures abroad, largely at the expense 
of young life . If we are, in fact, going through the last Viet Nam, 
if we are, in fact, getting out at last, as I devoutly hope, you 
have done your share to that end. 
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To be sure, the millenium has not yet arrived. Doomsday 
missiles in the United States point at doomsday missiles several 
thousand miles and a few minutes away. We still have vast garrisons 
on the mainland of Southeast Asia. Planes are still engaged in 
raining terror out of the Indochina skies. Ships sow the 
instruments of destruction in the waters south of China. Indeed, 
the Secretary of Defense has just told us that the spread of 
conflict, by sea and air, once again into North Viet Nam--this 
latest episode in the continuing agony of the Indochina War, 
will cost the people of the nation an additional $5 billion 
this year, not to speak of more lives, more prisoners-of-war, 
and more missing in action. 
Nor should we overlook, in any note of optimism, the 
social and economic overload which arises at home from these and 
other wasting demands abroad; the capacities of the nation are 
great but they are not unlimited. The strain of serving, for a 
quarter-of-a-century as the world's leading policeman, banker, 
pioneer in space and what-not shows in the prices that are paid 
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in every store in the nation. It shows, too, in the neglect 
of the environment, in the decay of cities and in the rise of 
crime, drug addiction and other barometers of social breakdown 
within our society. 
Before we can speak of any real light at the end of the 
tunnel, we must face up to the immediate problems of the transition 
from the exertions of war to the work of peace. That the 
adjustments can be difficult and painful has been brought home to 
us by the President's announcement that the ABM site at Malmstrom 
will become inoperative under the terms of the Nixon-Brezhnev 
treaty. In this case, as in many others, we must find--the 
federal government has an obligation to assist in finding--
constructive alternatives. 
These qualifications aside, however, the fact ts that the 
world has come a long distance towards sanity and order in the 
short space of a few months. That is why, in my judgment, the 
class of 1972 can look with some confidence to the future. 
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There is a chance that the evil genies which have plagued us for 
a quarter century can be put back securely in the bottle. 
Consider what has been achieved by the diplomacy of the 
past year. What comes to mind most vividly, of course, is the 
President's just completed journey to Moscow. The accords 
which were concluded there were highly significant in themselves. 
Yet, the most important result of the Moscow summit may be found 
not in specific achievements. Rather, it may emerge from the 
changes of national attitude on both sides which were reflected 
in the meetings. 
The results of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks indicated a clear 
acceptance of mutual self-interest as the basis for the future 
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
We have not always been very prompt in the past to recognize 
nat i onal self-interest as a basis for a policy of peace. To be 
sure, we have sometimes over-assumed a national interest, as in 
Viet Nam and on that basis, spent the lives of tens of thousands 
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of Americans and permitted over $130 bjllion dollars to be sucked 
up by the destructive sponge of that conflict. Now, after years 
of this deadly wastage we have at last discovered that our only 
valid national concern is to get back the prisoners of war and 
the recoverable missing in action. We have come at last to 
realize that our only national interest is to get out of the 
Indochina involvement, lock, stock and barrel. 
If on s0me occasions we have over-assumed natjonal interests, 
on others, we have ignored them almost as though they were not 
fitting to a great power. So, we have hesitated to define our 
bona fide concerns and pursued, instead, the will o'the wisp of 
ideological conflict. We have done so on the basis of such 
slogans as "Make the World Safe for Democracy," and most recently 
the "Battle for the Minds of Men" or the "Containment of Communism. 11 
The pursuit of ideological struggle has not led us to any victories. 
Rather, it has projected us into a hodge-podge of foreign aid, 
military alliances and into overseas propaganda and other dubious 
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mnnlpulntlve oper:1 ti onB . '!'he wnrm humA.n conce rn or Amerl cHnc 
f or other peoples has been distorted by ideological wa rfare nnd 
we have plunged, w· th r> u.t warrnnt, lnt n the internal pr:>lltlcal 
and social affairs of other nnt lr:>no everywhere In the wo r l d. 
For two decades this costly exerc1se has bec ome A. way of l lfe ror 
hundreds of thousands o f Americans, some :l f whom have scarcely 
set foot tn the Unl.ted States f or many years. If there ls a new 
light of hope, It is In large part bec ause this random flalllng 
appears t o be coming t o Rn end. In plnce o f the cacophr:>ny o f the 
Cold War, the recent Moscow conference spoke softly of "Basic 
Pr inciples o f Mutual RelA.tl ons between the Unl.ted StA.tes and the 
U.S.S.R.'' In these principles, the twn nations recognized that 
there Is no feasible answer In a nuclear age to the pro spect of 
mutual annlhilatlon other than mutual collaboration. 
The two pr:>wers have begun, now, to move toward what President 
Nixon has called a posi tion of "mutually agreed restraint" In 
a rmaments. To that end, a treaty has been negotiated by President 
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Nixon to limit offensive and defensive strategi.c nuclear weapons 
on both sides. As I have already indicated, this treaty has a 
special meaning for Montana because it is expected that Malmstrom 
will not be devel oped now as an ABM site . In the circumstances, 
what I told the Senate in opposing the ABM program three years 
ago bears repeating today. On April l, 1969, I said: "If this 
proposed ABM missile system ... is right for the nat i on, it will 
be right for Montana. If it is wrong for the nat ion, however, the 
location of one s j te at Malmstrom cannot make it rLght. 
"What economic benefit to a Montana community will equal 
the additional tax burdens and the new inflati on which will 
weigh on all the people of Montana ... ? If the system becomes an 
insatiable maw for the consumption of public resources, who will 
pay for the neglect of other urgent needs, if not all the people 
of the nation including Montanans?" 
That was my position on the ABM three years ago . It remains 
my position. I will support the President in regard to the 
Nixon-Brezhnev Treaty. 
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The diplomacy by wh i ch the treaty was negotiated is s i milar 
to that which led the President to take the first steps in 
breaking down the barr iers of isolation and separation with the 
People's Republic of China. To digress for a moment for a personal 
note, let me say that on March 29, 1968, I gave the first lecture 
sponsored by the Mike and Maureen Mansfield Foundation at the 
University. The subject was "China: Retrospect and Prospect." 
My remarks, four years ago, contained this statement: 
"It ought to be made unequivocal that we are 
prepared at all t i mes to meet with Chinese 
representatives--formally or informally--in 
order to consider differences between China 
and the United States over Viet Nam or any other 
question of common concern." 
The President's visit to Peking early this year which 
was followed by the journey of the Senate Minority Leader and 
myself a few weeks ago, has now made unequivocal the readiness 
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of this nat·on to meet with China to the end that difficulties 
may be dissolved and civil contact restored between the two 
peoples. Four years is a long tjme. It is a long delay--but 
it is a beginning. The Great Wall of separation has commenced 
to crumble and the way to a stable peace in Asia is opening at last. 
What the President has done with regard to the Chinese 
Pe,ple's Republic is to remove a self-imposed straight-jacket 
on the foreign policies of the nation. Following World War II, 
for example, rather than face the great upheaval which had taken 
place in China, we chose not to recognize but to quarantine it. 
We cut ourselves off from contact with these monumental changes, 
thinking all the while that by so doing we somehow could exercise 
political control over them. In retrospect, it is clear that we 
had little or no effect over the course of events. 
The fact is that there was a viable and independent 
government in control in China for many years before we chose 
to acknowledge that such was the case. It availed us nothing 
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to ignore and isolate ourselves from that government. Yet, we 
continued to do so long after this policy had lost the last 
shred of a rationale. 
Now that myths have begun to be replaced by realit i es, 
we can proceed to explore wjth the People's Republic of China, 
as the President has started to do with the Soviet Union, the 
possibilities of mutual accommodatjon. The change comes very late. 
Already, as I have indicated, the economy of the nation reveals 
the stresses imposed by unrealist i c and excessively c o stly 
foreign-defense policies. Last year, for example, it was necessary 
to devalue the dollar, to raise import dut i es and to impose 
domestic controls to prevent a catastro phic breakdown in the 
nation's financial grid. The process of adjustment had been 
delayed too long to make a g raceful and painless transition and 
it will be prudent to antic i pate still other shocks in the future. 
Nevertheless, we are now moving in the d i rection of 
mutuality, of a sharing of responsibilities and leadership wi th 
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other nations. In part, this process depends on negotiations. 
In part, however, it is possible to take unilateral actions. 
It is not always necessary to await the pleasure of others in 
order to lighten our self-imposed burdens. I have, f or example, 
not hesitated to urge unilateral action at various times wi th 
regard to Vi et Nam in an effort to bring the involvement to a 
more rapid conclus ion. I have done so because the ending of this 
mistaken adventure is our problem and our problem alone. Every 
day that the involvement persists adds to the burdens of the 
people of th i s nation, to the list of dead and wounded and to the 
devastat ion of the hapless people of Indochina. Others may have 
an interest in our withdrawal from this conflict. But none has 
a more vital interest than thi s nation in getting out wi thout delay. 
I have also urged unilateral action to bring about a 
substantial reduction of U. S. forces in Europe. There is no 
rhyme or reason, in my judgment, to keep more than half-million 
U. S. military personnel and dependents in Western Europe a quarter 
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of a century after World War II at the expense of the people 
of the United States. Whatever purposes of foreign policy the 
U. S. garrison in Europe may still serve, the same purposes can 
be met by a far smaller contingent. As it is now, this enormous 
deployment is a drain on U. S. revenues; it is fuel for inflation 
in the United States and it is a major source of the weakness of 
the dollar in relation to the currencies of other nations. 
I have stressed this issue time and again against the 
resistance of the Executive Branch under the Administrations of 
three Presidents. Insofar as I am c oncerned, it will continue 
to be stressed, notwithstanding the Moscow agreements which call 
for negotiation of mutual and balanced reductions of forces in 
Europe. The fact is that the Soviet Union does not pay for this 
antiquated and largely irrelevant U. S. deployment. The Europeans 
do not pay for it . The people of this nation pay the cost in 
their taxes. I see no particular virtue in prolonged negotiations 
with the Russians to bring about a reduction of U. S. forces which 
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should have been done years ago in our own interest. I am 
appalled to think of the billions which have already been 
wasted in this long waiting game. 
There was a time within the clear remembrance of many of 
us here today, when the rhetoric of Cold War was part and parcel 
of policy. That was a time when there did not appear to be any 
mutuality of interests between East and West and when it would 
have been futile to urge unilateral steps to reduce tensions. 
Those were the days when each nation was what George Washington 
so correctly described as the 11 slave of its own animosity. 11 
The essential fact in precipitating the Cold War was that 
two powerful new forces--ideology and technology--came together at 
the close of World War II. Th j s fusion vastly complicated the 
whole interplay of international affairs. The technological 
problem was awesome in its simplicity. With the great flood of 
scientific and engineering advances, governments came into 
possession of the power of instant and worldwide destruction. 
In consequence, the processes of statecraft were compressed in 
time and altered radically in conduct. 
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In th i s country there was a Constitutional fall-out from 
these technological developments. The power of the Executive 
Branch in foreign affairs increased drastically even as the 
power of legislatures shrank in proportion. In crises, so it 
was reasoned, there would not be time to make political decisions, 
much less debate the issues. At the same time, the new technology 
of war, by its scope and complexity, became more than ever a 
partner of government, with a vested interest in its own perpetuity 
and a h igh potential for distorting public decisions about war 
and peace. 
The other aspect of the Cold War--the ideological problem--
arose from the fact that two of the victors in World War II--the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China--were revolutionary 
states committed to a system of social and economic organization 
which was anathema to this nation. The conspiratorial aspect of 
Communism posed a particularly painful problem for the United 
States, breeding suspicion, distrust and division in government. 
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It became difficult to separate valid threats to national 
security from the bombast of the power-seekers. Enlightened 
public debate became constrained and as a result public policy 
was not always subjected as fully as it should have been to the 
purgative of critical challenge. So the political paroxysms 
of the '50's led to the rigid policies of the •6o•s. 
History may well record that we pursued the correct foreign 
policies into the early 1960's; that we bought time, through 
containment and counterforce, to permit the gradual moderation 
of Communist power, thereby reducing the Marxist states to the 
political d i mensions of other nat j_ons. However that may be, it 
has been apparent for some time that we persisted in these policies 
too long. We were blind to changes elsewhere and to the possibili-
ties of adjust i ng to mutual interest. In the end, we came to 
the disaster of Viet Nam. It is part of the price which has been 
exacted for the obstinate pursuit of the obsolete in foreign 
policy. 
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How can it be prevented from happening again? Quite 
possibly the world will not soon see a repetition of the 
particular confluence of historical forces--ideology and 
technology--which produced the rigidities of the Cold War. 
Possibly, the awareness of our own electorate may now be such 
that prolonged periods of national self-delusion will no longer 
be countenanced. Perhaps, more effective techniques will be 
found in the art of government which will act to limber the dead 
weight of massive bureaucracy and so bring about a greater 
responsiveness to changing circumstances both at home and 
abroad. Perhaps, the addition of the under-21-voters to the 
electorate will revitalize the entire political process. In 
any event, it is doubtful that your generation--seared as it 
has been by the folly and outrage of Viet Nam--will long 
suffer in silence a foreign policy which is based on the 
outdated. 
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In the final analysis it comes down to the degree 
to which an enlightened and vigorous electorate will probe 
and test and call to account the policies of its own government. 
President Brewster of Yale has put it in these words: 
"Exposure, questioning, reappraisal are often 
painful, even agonizing; their price is nothing, 
however, compared to the resentment aroused by a 
feeling of manipulated ignorance." 
Your generation has some reason to feel, I'm sure, that 
it has paid the high price of "manipulated ignorance." At least 
you have the advantage of knowing clearly what your generation 
must avoid. I am confident that you can and will not only skirt 
the pitfalls of the past, but being thus spared the old burdens, 
you will be free to explore the vast possibilities of mutual 
accommodation with all peoples in a world which is now beginning 
to be liberated from its obsolete fears. 
You can do no more. You should do no less. 
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